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and René Zweigelae
Abstract
This publication presents the development of integrity monitoring and
fault detection and exclusion (FDE) of pseudorange measurements, which
are used to aid a tightly-coupled navigation filter. This filter is based on
an inertial measurement unit (IMU) and is aided by signals of the global
navigation satellite system (GNSS). Particularly, the GNSS signals include
global positioning system (GPS) and Galileo. By using GNSS signals, navi-
gation systems suffer from signal interferences resulting in large pseudorange
errors. Further, a higher number of satellites with dual-constellation increases
the possibility that satellite observations contain multiple faults. In order to
ensure integrity and accuracy of the filter solution, it is crucial to provide
sufficient fault-free GNSS measurements for the navigation filter. For this
purpose, a new hybrid strategy is applied, combining conventional receiver
autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM) and innovative robust set inversion
via interval analysis (RSIVIA). To further improve the performance, as well
as the computational efficiency of the algorithm, the estimated velocity and
its variance from the navigation filter is used to reduce the size of the RSIVIA
initial box. The designed approach is evaluated with recorded data from an
extensive real-world measurement campaign, which has been carried out in
GATE Berchtesgaden, Germany. In GATE, up to six Galileo satellites in orbit
can be simulated. Further, the signals of simulated Galileo satellites can be
manipulated to provide faulty GNSS measurements, such that the fault detec-
tion and identification (FDI) capability can be validated. The results show
that the designed approach is able to identify the generated faulty GNSS
observables correctly and improve the accuracy of the navigation solution.
Compared with traditional RSIVIA, the designed new approach provides a
more timely fault identification and is computationally more efficient.
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Keywords: RSIVIA, RAIM, GNSS, fault detection and identification, Kalman
filter
1 Introduction
As described in the market report from the European Global Navigation Satellite
Systems Agency (GSA) [5], satellite-based navigation will substantially contribute
to the future innovation of self-driving vehicles. In autonomous applications, espe-
cially in safety-critical scenarios, a false estimation of vehicle states can result in
catastrophic accidents. Therefore, a reliable navigation solution with high integrity
is required. To maintain the integrity of a satellite-based navigation system, the
faulty GNSS observations caused by signal interferences and other possible reasons
shall be detected, identified and excluded. Ever since the operation of open service
of the newly developed EU satellite navigation system Galileo, the combination of
GPS and Galileo provides more available satellites in view for the modern naviga-
tion systems. However, a higher number of satellites also increases the possibility
that satellite observations contain a fault or even multi-faults. Therefore, iden-
tification of multi-faults becomes a crucial and challenging task to maintain the
integrity of GNSS-based navigation systems.
The previous work [10] presents the development of a fault detection and ex-
clusion (FDE) algorithm of GNSS measurements. The approach operates as an
extension of a tightly-coupled navigation filter, which integrates the measurements
from GNSS, an inertial measurement unit (IMU) and a Doppler velocity log (DVL)
[6]. In [10], FDE bases on the receiver autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM)
approach with parity space [12], which is a pure statistical method. RAIM predicts
pseudorange residuals, which are based on the estimated reference vehicle state
using least square method, and uses the residuals to detect and identify pseudo-
range faults. Since RAIM is a pure statistic method and based on single fault
assumption, it might not always be adequate, if multiple measurements are faulty.
This can be observed in [11]. This work concentrates on multi-fault identification,
when the conventional statistic based approach cannot certainly provide a correct
identification solution.
In recent years, an alternative localization method, set inversion via interval
analysis (SIVIA), is developed under such concern. SIVIA estimates a trust region
of the state space fulfilling a predefined confidence level. The basic operations of
interval analysis are introduced in [7] and applied to realize robot localization in
[8]. Further, [13] shows an example of integrating velocity information from DVL
to compute the guaranteed robot trajectories using interval analysis. With respect
of GNSS application, robust SIVIA (RSIVIA) approach is applied for satellite po-
sitioning in [3] [4], which allows to estimate the trust region of antenna position
with existing erroneous pseudorange measurements. Hereby, it is possible to iden-
tify outliers in the GNSS observations by checking the compatibility of each GNSS
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measurement and the estimated trust region. The main drawback of this approach
is its computational load, because RSIVIA begins with an initial guess of an ar-
bitrary big box, bisects it into small boxes and operates on them separately and
iteratively. In addition, RSIVIA usually runs at a lower rate (1 Hz in [4]) than
GNSS observations (10 Hz in current navigation filter), such that the timely fault
identification can not be guaranteed. This can result in corrupted state estimation,
when there is an increasing pseudorange error [14].
The present publication proposes a FDE scheme to benefit the advantages of
RAIM and RSIVIA and compensates the disadvantages of them, which is illustrated
in Fig. 1. Once a new set of GNSS measurements is available, fault detection and
identification (FDI) of RAIM are carried out iteratively. Eventually, a fault alert
is generated from RAIM and used as a trigger for RSIVIA, if RAIM still detects
a fault but is not capable to identify it. This reduces the computational load and
enables a more timely fault identification. When RSIVIA is triggered for the further
FDI task, it is executed in an iterative process, which refers to RSIVIA GNSS
update in Fig. 1: it starts with the assumption that no fault exists in the observed
measurement space. Whenever an empty trust region is returned, RSIVIA assumes
one more fault existing in the measurements. This iterative process continues until
a non-empty trust region is estimated. The rest of the faulty measurements are

















































































Figure 1: Scheme of GNSS FDE involving RAIM and RSIVIA
To reduce the computational load, RSIVIA is initialized with an arbitrary big
box and the first trust region is estimated only with GNSS measurements. After
that, the estimated velocity information and its variance from the navigation filter
are used to propagate the trust region from last step. In this way, further RSIVIA
steps start with the propagated trust box as initial guess, whose size is much smaller
than an arbitrary big box.
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Furthermore, output from the conventional RAIM is used to aid RSIVIA. Esti-
mated horizontal protection level (HPL) is used for parameterizing minimal error
bound, whose deterministic calculation is not given in [3] [4] for GNSS application.
The designed approach is evaluated in post-processing environment with the
recorded data, with respect of correctness of FDI, accuracy improvement of the
navigation solution and reduce of computational load. In order to reproduce the test
scenario in a post-processing environment, all sensors and GNSS correction data are
recorded in real-world tests at Galileo test and development environment (GATE) in
Berchtesgaden, Germany. To validate the FDI functionality, the fault identification
results are compared with report of generated faulty Galileo measurements from
IFEN GmbH.
The paper is structured as follows: First, the state vector of navigation filter
and RAIM are introduced briefly. Then, the method of RSIVIA using GNSS mea-
surements is described as the basic. At the end of methodology part, the practical
integration of velocity outputs from navigation filter and RAIM is given. In the
experimental validation part, the measurement setup and target hardware are de-
scribed, experimental results are evaluated and discussed afterwards. Finally, the
last section draws the conclusion and provides an outlook for future developments
of integrity monitoring within inertial navigation system.
2 Methodology
2.1 Navigation Filter
The basic concepts and equations of a tightly-coupled navigation filter are intro-
duced in [6] [9]. This section concentrates on introducing the filter outputs. In total,
18 states are predicted within a strap-down algorithm using the measurements from
3D accelerometer and 3D gyroscope,




b ba bg cb cd]
T . (1)
The state vector x contains position peeb of the IMU body-frame origin in Earth-
Centered-Earth-Fixed (ECEF) coordinates (3× 1) and the velocity of body-frame
origin vneb (3×1), which is in navigation frame North-East-Down (NED) coordinates
with respect to ECEF frame. Furthermore, a quaternion qnb for alignment of body
frame and NED frame (4 × 1), accelerometer bias ba (3 × 1) and gyroscope bias
bg (3× 1) are estimated. Additionally, a tightly coupled system needs to estimate
receiver clock bias cb and drift cd for correction of pseudo- and deltaranges. The
process and measurement model used for Kalman update is given in [6] [9]. It should
be stressed that the velocity information vneb is given in NED coordinates, which
is one important reason for choosing NED coordinates as the operation navigation
frame for RSIVIA. The other reason is that using NED coordinates makes it easier
to distinguish between horizontal and vertical components. Focusing on horizontal
components is important for most autonomous applications.
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2.2 RAIM with Parity Space
The previous work [10] presents the development of a FDE extension based on
RAIM. The necessary equations of residual-based RAIM for pseudorange fault de-
tection are given in [1] [10]. Further, using parity space based RAIM for fault
identification is introduced in [12] [10]. Hereby, only necessary theory is explained,
helping to understand the integration of RAIM in Sec. 2.5.
In General, RAIM uses the pseudorange residuals to detect and identify faulty
GNSS measurements. Pseudoranges are predicted, based on the estimated ref-
erence vehicle states. The pseudorange residuals are calculated as the difference
between measured and predicted pseudoranges. According to statistics, with ν
independent standard normal random variables, the sum of their squares satisfies
chi-squared distribution with ν degree of freedom (DOF). Assuming that the pseu-
dorange measurement noise satisfies the white mean Gaussian distribution with
various standard deviation. After using pseudorange measurements to estimate the
4 unknowns by using least square approach, the normalized predicted residual of
pseudoranges ν shall satisfy N − 4 DOF chi-squared distribution. N is the number
of available pasudorange measurements. Otherwise, RAIM shall declare that an
error occurs. The fault identification is done iteratively with the help of parity
space using Bayes Rule, assuming all satellites having the same prior probability of
being faulty [12][10]. It should be noticed that RAIM also estimates HPL, which
is a function of pseudorange variances, the geometric satellite constellation and
the predefined parameters, i.e. false alarm rate and missed detection probability.
The estimated HPL is used in Sec. 2.5 to parametrize the minimal error bound of
RSIVIA.
2.3 RSIVIA with Pseudorange Measurements
2.3.1 Interval Analysis Basics
Interval analysis (also called interval computation) is the operation on intervals
instead of algebraic operation on numbers, although the basic operators are the
same as in algebraic operation: +, −, ×, ÷, sin, tan, exp. The computation of
intervals is defined in [7], as follows
[a]♦[b] = [{a♦b ∈ R|a ∈ [a], b ∈ [b]}], (2)
where [a] and [b] are intervals. Further, the high dimensional interval is defined as
a box. ♦ can be any of the algebraic operations listed above. By applying interval




([xsn,i]− [xan])2 + ([xse,i]− [xae ])2 + ([xsd,i]− [xad])2 + [cb], ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N},
(3)











the antenna position and receiver clock bias, both in NED frame. N is the number
of available pseudorange measurements.
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2.3.2 Measurement Bounding
In the context of satellite pseudorange-based navigation, the measurement vector
is ρ̃ = [ρ̃1, · · · , ρ̃i, · · · , ρ̃N ]. Based on the measured pseudoranges ρ̃, the interval of
them [ρ] should be estimated. In [4], an approach is proposed, estimating the lower
and upper bound of the measurements, tolerating faulty measurements. Allowing
a certain number of faulty measurements to estimate the trust box is defined as
q-relax, where q is the number of tolerated faulty measurements.
Consider a set of N available measurements with the condition of q-relax, it
means that at least N−q measurements are required to be fault free. It is assumed
that the probability of a measurement being faulty satisfies binomial distribution.
The probability of q-relax condition satisfied is calculated as
P (nff ≥ N − q) =
N∑
k=N−q





pkff (1− pff )N−k, (4)
where the confidence level P (nff ≥ N − q) is predefined. Therefore, pff can be
estimated as the only unknown in Eq. (4), which is the probability of each satellite
being faulty free. The probability density function of a measurement noise is known
as f(e), which is practically assumed to be a white Gaussian distribution. In this
way, for each measurement pff is calculated as




With pff estimated from Eq. (4), the lower and upper bound can be calculated by
minimizing the width of the interval [a, b].
2.3.3 The RSIVIA Process with GNSS Measurements
To estimate the trust box of the state vector [xa], RSIVIA starts with the feasible
initial guess [xa0 ], which allows to be arbitrarily big and guarantees the true solution
of xa inside it. RSIVIA attempts to reduce the size of the initial guess with a
contractor C. A contractor is an operator IRn → IRn associated to a constraint
(in our case Eq. (3)), which returns a box C[x] ⊆ [x] without losing any vector
consistent with the constraint [13]. If the size of the operated box cannot be further
reduced by a contractor , it will be bisected into two small boxes and the contractor
operation will be repeated for all small boxes remained. This process ends, until
the width of all remained boxes is smaller than a predefined error bound ε. The
detailed design of the RSIVIA process in GNSS applications is given in [3] [4], which
includes forward and backward contractor using constraints given in Eq. (3). This
RSIVIA operation is summarized as Line 4 in Alg. 1.
Alg. 1 gives the whole process of a bounding box update, when a new GNSS
measurement is available. This process starts with a fault-free assumption (q = 0)
and attempts to estimate the trust region with an increasing q. This operation is
summarized as GNSS update. The resulting box [xa] is applied in Eq. (3) to predict
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Algorithm 1 GNSS update with pseudorange measurements
Function gnss update(in:[xa0 ],x
s,ρ, ε, out:[xa],f )
1: Initialization: [xa]← ∅, q ← 0, get number of satellites N
2: while ( [xa] = ∅ & N − q ≥ 4 ) do
3: ([xs], [ρ])← get bounds(xs,ρ, q) Sec. 2.3.2
4: [xa]← rsivia(in:[xa0 ], [xs], [ρ], q, ε)
5: if [xa] = ∅ then
6: q ← q + 1
7: else









d,i]. The faulty measurement is identified when the predicted pseudo-
range interval has no intersection with the measured one. This consistency check
returns a fault vector f consisting of N elements, which are 0 or 1, representing
whether this measurement is fault free.
Still, questions remain in this process, i.e. how should the initial guess [xa0 ] and
the minimal acceptable error bound ε be chosen, considering both the correctness
of fault identification and computational load. These will be answered in Sec. 2.4
and 2.5, respectively.
2.4 Integration of Velocity Information in RSIVIA
In [13], a frame is proposed for guaranteed integration of state equations. An
example is given in [13], which uses DVL measurements and differential state con-
straints to estimate tubes of driven trajectories of an autonomous underwater vehi-
cle (AUV). A tube is defined as an envelope, which encloses an uncertain trajectory.
To estimate the tube, a differential tube contractor C d
dt
is applied, which consists
of a forward contractor C→d
dt
and a backward contractor C←d
dt
[13].
Due to several reasons, only forward contraction C→d
dt
is applied in the current
work, using the output velocity information from the navigation filter in Sec. 2.1.
First, the propagated box using velocity information is not the output as in [13].
Instead, the propagated box is only used as the initial box [xa0 ] for GNSS update
in Alg. 1. GNSS update still dominates the result of the trust box estimation.
Second, in [13] backward contraction is necessary, because only the DVL velocity
measurements are available. Without backward contraction, the size of estimated
tubes can never be reduced, because it is the integration of the width of mea-
surement error bound. Due to the usage of GNSS measurements, this is not the
situation in current publication. In practice, the estimated velocity is with relative
narrow variance, which enables an accurate propagation, without losing integrity
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of the initial guess [xa0 ]. This will be validated in Sec. 3.2.1. Further, the size of
the boxes can be strongly reduced by the GNSS update. Considering the difficulty
of operating on multi-rate navigation system with GNSS measurement time delay,
only forward contractor with the following differential constraint is applied,
[xa](t+ dt) = [xa0 ](t+ dt) ∩ ([xa](t) + dt · [ẋa](t)). (6)
As mentioned in Sec. 2.1, all the operations are carried out in NED coordinates,
such that ẋa is already given in Eq. (1): ẋa = [ vneb cd]
T . The bounding box [ẋa]
is estimated with the output ẋa and its estimated covariance from the navigation
filter. The detailed contractor design and discretization are given in [13].
In practice, GNSS measurement is updated with the rate of ca. 10 Hz and with
a time delay of 50 ∼ 300 milliseconds. This time delay is a result of signal pro-
cessing from the GNSS receiver, after satellite signals are received by the antenna.
However, the navigation filter runs at 100 Hz, because a high-rate navigation so-
lution is necessary for autonomous vehicles. Considering the unnegligible delay, a
structure is proposed in Fig. 2, which is an example supposing GNSS time delay is
30 milliseconds.
Fig. 2 shows, when no GNSS update is available, the box at k + 1 step is
propagated using [xak] and [ẋ
a
k] from last step. Without additional information of
the initial box at k+1 step, the initial box [xa0,k+1] is taken as [−inf , inf ], such that
the part after ∩ symbol in Eq. 6 dominates the calculation. Once a GNSS update
is available, the time of GNSS measurement is estimated by comparing the current
time and measured time delay. The propagated box stored in the buffer is located
and used as the initial guess [xa0 ] for the GNSS update, which is described in Sec.
2.3.3. After GNSS update, all the boxes until the current epoch are propagated
again and the corresponding buffer will be replaced.
Fig. 3 shows an one dimensional example, which illustrates the change of esti-
mated upper and lower bound before and after the GNSS update. In this example,
the GNSS measurement is received at k + 4 epoch (current) with time delay of 3
epochs, such that the GNSS update is carried out in the past (at k + 1 epoch).
The bounds at k + 1 epoch (black) are used as initial guess for GNSS update and
narrower bounds (blue) are estimated. The blue bounds are propagated using the
stored velocity information in memory until the current time (k + 4 epoch).
GNSS ( time delay: 3 epochs)here:


















Figure 2: Propagation and GNSS update considering measurement delay
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Figure 3: One dimensional (1D) example of integrating velocity information and
resulting variance in GNSS update
2.5 Integration of RAIM
By integrating velocity information, RSIVIA does not start with an arbitrary box
anymore, which reduces the computational load. This can be further improved by
triggering the RSIVIA, when a GNSS update is necessary, instead of executing it
by each new GNSS measurement. Whether a GNSS update is necessary, is decided
by the RAIM fault detection result.
Algorithm 2 Integration velocity and RAIM information into RSIVIA at kth step
Function estimate box(in:xsk,ρk, td,xk−1,P k−1, out:[x
a
k],fk)
1: Store xk−1 and P k−1 into buffer
2: if New GNSS measurement then
3: (fa, ε)← raim(xsk, ρk, xk−1) Sec. 2.2
4: if fa = true | tc − tu > tu,max then
5: Estimate GNSS delay steps: nd ← td/T0




k,ρk, ε) Sec. 2.3.3
7: for i = k − nd + 1 to k do




















16: return [xak], fk
Nevertheless, a situation should be avoided that no GNSS update is executed
for a long duration, when no fault is detected by RAIM. Therefore, a parameter
tu,max is introduced, which defines the maximum duration allowed between two
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GNSS updates. The detailed implementation is given in Alg. 2, where tc and tu
are the current time and time of last GNSS update, respectively. td is the GNSS
measurement time delay. To is the navigation filter sample time.
Furthermore, Alg. 2 proposes a new method of parameterizing the minimum
error bound ε of RSIVIA, which is a parameter used in Alg. 1. In [8], guaranteed
minimum outlier number estimator (GOMNE) is applied, which proposes to reduce
the error bound to half of the previous value (ε← ε/2), when the q-relax increases.
Still, the initial value of ε needed to be parametrized with this method. [2] dis-
cusses the choice of the error bound and the pseudorange quality by comparing
different settings of ε. However, a deterministic calculation of the error bound ε is
never given. By introducing the output of RAIM, both satellite constellation and
measurement quality are considered (Sec. 2.2).
3 Experimental Validation
In this section, the experimental results of the proposed approach for GNSS in-
tegrity monitoring as well as pseudorange measurements FDE are given. The re-
sults are divided into two parts: first, the evaluation of the dynamic propagation
using the velocity information; second, the validation of the FDE capability, the
computational load and the accuracy improvement.
3.1 Measurement Setup and Test Scenario
The sensor data is recorded on a 900 MHz single core rapid control prototyping
(RCP) unit, called MicroAutoBox II from dSPACE. GNSS signals are received and
decoded by a Septentrio AstRx3 HDC receiver at a rate of 10 Hz. The communi-
cation between the receiver and the RCP unit is achieved via serial interface. For
inertial measurement, the setup uses a LORD MicroStrain 3DM-GX4-25 industrial-
class 9 DOF IMU-sensor, which is connected via serial interface and provides accel-
erations, angular rates and magnetometer measurements at a rate of 100 Hz. The
receiver provides a pulse per second (PPS). Using the PPS, the communication and
processing delays of the receiver are measured (see [8]). In order to reproduce the
real-world test scenario in a post-processing environment, all sensors and GNSS
correction data are recorded.
Fig. 4 shows the bird eye view of the driven trajectory. The experiment is car-
ried out in the so-called ”T-Cross” in Berchtesgaden, Germany, because it is the
best test track for the visibility of all three base stations from GATE system. It
should be noticed that the driven path in this experiment is in open area. There-
fore, it is assumed that, except the generated feared events, the measurements from
other satellites are fault free. However, the testing scenario is only reproducible
by replay of the recorded data in post-processing environment, due to the chang-
ing environment in the reality, e.g. position of real satellites, ionosphere delay
and troposphere delay. The post-processing environment runs on the MATLAB &
Simulink platform on a laptop with an Intel Core i7-7700HQ CPU @ 2.80GHz.































Figure 4: Reference trajectory using a RTK capable GNSS receiver, ©2019
GeoBasis-DE/BKG (©2009), Google
During this drive, two feared events occur, which are range errors intentionally
generated by GATE system. These errors are visualized in Fig. 5, which shows the
pseudorange residuals of GPS and Galileo signals during this drive. The pseudo-
range residuals are calculated as the difference between measured and true pseu-
doranges. Here, true pseudoranges are estimated with the highly accurate RTK
reference solution and satellite positions. Fig. 5 shows that from second 108 to 172
and from second 188 to 252, the pseudorange residuals from four Galileo satellites
E10, E16, E17, E23 are extremely high. These are the two periods when feared
events occur, which is verified by the experiment report from IFEN GmbH. These
two periods are marked with the gray dashed lines in the following figures.
time in sec
0 50 100 150 200 250 300


























Figure 5: GNSS pseudorange residuals
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3.2 Experimental Results
3.2.1 Velocity Integration without GNSS update
In this section, dynamic propagation using velocity information is validated. The
box [xa] is initialized when the first GNSS measurement is available. After that,
the trust box is only propagated with the velocity information without further
GNSS update. Various parameter settings and potential situations are evaluated
and discussed. The three settings are:
• Setting 01: The trust box is propagated only with velocity information with-
out considering their variance, which means the velocity error bound is zero.
• Setting 02: The trust box is propagated in the same way as Setting 01. The
faulty GNSS measurements from E10, E16, E17, E23 are manually excluded.
• Setting 03: The trust box is propagated with velocity information and its
variance. The error bound of velocity is estimated with the approach from
Sec 2.3.2 without measurement relax using the estimated variance.
Experimental results are shown in Fig. 6. The three subfigures are the difference
between propagated upper and lower bounds of antenna position in NED coordi-
nates and their reference, respectively. It can be observed that with Setting 01
the lower and upper bounds are evenly distributed around the reference, before the
first feared event. During the first feared event, the propagated bounds in north
direction shift downwards, which makes the distance between the upper bound and
the reference smaller. During the second feared event, the bounds drift further
downwards and eventually cross the reference, which makes it an invalid propa-
gation. The reason is that the huge pseudorange error results in faulty velocity
estimation of the navigation filter. This can be verified with the Setting 02. After
excluding the feared event manually, the velocity propagation is valid during the
whole experiment. Introducing the estimated variance of the velocity estimation
solves this problem, which is verified with Setting 03. The width of the trust box
increases, when no GNSS update is carried out, because the width of the trust box
is the integration of velocity error bounds.
It can also be observed that the width of the trust box is no larger than 100 me-
ters, although there is no GNSS update in 300 seconds. This means, the confidential
level of the velocity information can be set higher, if periodic GNSS updates are
carried out. Because GNSS updates will reduce the size of trust box periodically,
this will not introduce much extra computational load.
3.2.2 Identification Correctness and Accuracy Improvement
In [11], a situation is described in the experimental validation chapter, that RAIM
with parity space fails to identify all faults in a very short period, while RSIVIA
is capable to identify all faulty pseudoranges. The comparison between RAIM and
RSIVIA under such condition is given in [11], and therefore, is not repeated in the
present publication. In this section, the GNSS update as well as the integration



























Figure 6: Validation of trust box propagation using velocity information without
GNSS update: estimated upper and lower bounds minus the reference
of velocity information and RAIM are evaluated, with respect of identification
correctness, the accuracy improvement and the computational load. To achieve the
comparison of these, three settings are used in this section:
• Setting 04: GNSS update runs in 1 Hz. Each RSIVIA process starts with an
initial guess of an arbitrary big box.
• Setting 05: GNSS update runs in 1 Hz. The trust box is propagated with
velocity information (Sec. 2.4). RSIVIA starts with propagated trust box.
• Setting 06: The complete proposed approach in Sec. 2.5 is applied here. In
case of no RAIM fault alert, the maximum duration without GNSS update
tu,max is 60 seconds.
Fig. 7 shows the experimental results. The first subfigure shows the fault identi-
fication result from the three settings and the satellites availability during the test
drive. As already shown in Fig. 5, the pseudorange error gradually increases at the
beginning of each feared event. This type of pseudorange fault is introduced in [14]
as most hazardous fault model for snapshot integrity monitoring, because the state
estimation are corrupted before the fault is identified.
This can be verified by Fig. 7. When the first feared even starts (at 108.4
seconds), the erroneous pseudorange is first identified with Setting 06 (at 109.87
seconds), then with Setting 04 (at 110.20 seconds) and finally with Setting 05 (at
110.67 seconds). The reason of the identification delay with Setting 04 and 05 is,
that the GNSS update runs in 1 Hz due to the high computational load, while
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Figure 7: Validation of fault identification and accuracy improvement
the GNSS measurements are received in 10 Hz. Furthermore, the GNSS update is
triggered timely by RAIM with Setting 06. Although the time difference of first
fault identification among three Settings is tiny, it results in significant difference
in state estimation.
The second subfigure shows the 2D error as a measure of state estimation quality.
Without FDE, the 2D error remains between 10 meters to 16 meters during the
feared events. With Setting 04 and 05, the 2D error increases up to 14 meters and
12 meters, respectively, and converges slowly towards the accuracy without feared
events. With Setting 06, the 2D error increases slightly to 3.7 meters, because the
fault is identified earlier, and converges quickly to 1 meter.
Finally, the computation time is evaluated. The post-processing takes 81.70
seconds without integrity monitoring, which is the baseline of computation time.
Further, the post-processing takes 276.68, 171.51 and 121.89 seconds with Setting
04, 05 and 06, respectively. Considering that GNSS update runs at 1 Hz both with
Setting 04 and 05, the number of GNSS updates is the same. By introducing the
velocity information to reduce the size of the initial guess, the average computation
time of each GNSS update is reduced by 53.94 %, which is very important for the
future real-time implementation. In contrast, RAIM reduces the total computation
time by reducing the number of GNSS updates, instead of reducing the average
computation time. Therefore, RAIM may not improve the real-time computational
performance very much. However, introducing RAIM provides a more timely fault
identification, which improves the accuracy of navigation solution.
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4 Conclusion
This publication presented the development of an integrity system as an extension
of a tightly-coupled navigation filter within the joint-project GALILEOnautic 2.
The main purpose of the integrity system is FDE of multi-faults in pseudorange
measurements, such that a set of fault-free GNSS measurements can be fed into
the navigation filter. In this work, a RSIVIA based FDE strategy is proposed,
which involves RAIM with parity space and velocity estimation from the navigation
filter. With respect to the experimental evaluation, an offline post-processing using
data from GATE Berchtesgaden is carried out. In this experiment, multiple feared
events are intentionally generated, which are correctly identified by the proposed
approach. The measurement campaign evaluations visualize that this approach
improves notably both the accuracy and robustness of the navigation filter and
reduces significantly the computational load compared to the traditional RSIVIA.
In future works, a real time implementation of the designed approach is aimed.
On this basis, an integrity monitoring system for all sensors integrated into the
navigation system will be developed, which considers IMU, DVL and GNSS mea-
surements. FDE will be performed on all measurements, which are used by the
navigation filter, to enhance the navigation filter reliability.
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84 Shuchen Liu, Jan-Jöran Gehrt, Dirk Abel, and René Zweigel
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